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Recent Developments 1487
Statute Prohibiting Maintenance of Billboards
Adjacent to Interstate Highway Is Valid
as Applied to Existing Billboards-
Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston*
In order to qualify for additional aid under the 1958 Federal-Aid
Highway Program, the Ohio legislature prohibited the erection or
maintenance of billboards for advertising purposes within 660 feet
of an interstate highway and declared billboards in violation of
the statute to be public nuisances subject to abatement.' As the
owner of seven signs which violated the statute, plaintiff sought an
injunction against the enforcement of the statute on the ground
that it bore no substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare. The trial court granted the injunction
and the court of appeals affirmed, holding the statute unconstitu-
tional as a taking of property without due process of law.2 On appeal
to the Ohio Supreme Court, held, reversed. Since the legislative
determination that there is a relationship between traffic safety and
billboard regulation along interstate highways is not clearly erro-
neous, the statute is a valid exercise of the police power. As applied
to existing billboards, the statute is a general police regulation, not
a zoning ordinance, and thus need not provide for nonconforming
uses.
The 1958 Federal-Aid Highway Program provides for an
increase in the federal portion of the cost of interstate highways in
any state which undertakes measures for the regulation of bill-
boards adjacent to such highways.3 Although certain qualifying
standards have been specified, 4 each state is free to develop its own
method of control. Each of the state regulations tested in the courts
has been upheld as a valid assertion of the police power.5 The police
0 176 Ohio St. 425, 200 N.E.2d 328 (1964).
1. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 5516.01.05, 5516.99 (Baldwin 1964).
2. The trial court found no substantial relation between the public health, safety,
morals, or welfare and the statute, either in its enactment or in its application.
Gbaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 20 Ohio Op. 2d 51, 184 N.E.2d 552 (1962). The
court of appeals, however, expressly confined its finding of "no substantial relation"
to the application of the statute to the specific billboards involved in this case.
Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 194 N.E.2d 158 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963).
3. 72 Stat. 904 (1958), as amended, 23 U.S.C. § 131(c) (Supp. V, 1964). For discus-
sion of the 1958 Act and other highway billboard regulations, see generally NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, HIGHWAY RESEARCH BD., OUTDOOR ADVERTISING ALONG HIGHWAYS
(1958); Powers, Control of Outdoor Advertising, 38 NEB. L. REv. 541 (1959); Price,
Billboard Regulation Along the Interstate Highway System, 8 KAN. L. REv. 81 (1959).
4. See 23 C.F.R. §§ 20.1-.10 (Supp. 1964).
5. See Moore v. Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964); Opinion of the Justices,
103 N.H. 268, 169 A.2d 762 (1961); New York State Thruway Authority v. Ashley
Motor Court, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 151, 218 N.Y.S.2d 640, 176 N.E.2d 566 (1961). The Wis-
consin statute was sustained by a lower court, but its holding was not appealed.
See Fuller v. Fiedler, 19 Wis. 2d 422, 120 N.W.2d 700 (1963).
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power, however, forms the basis both for general police regulations
and for zoning statutes, and although the two are similar in their
prospective application, they must be distinguished for purposes of
their retroactive effect.
Whether an enactment is to be characterized as a general police
regulation or a zoning statute has been said to depend upon its
nature, purpose, terms, and provisions.8 The Ohio billboard statute
would seem to have some of the attributes of each. The statute is
by its terms an isolated attempt to regulate only billboards, rather
than all land use along the interstate highways, and thus is suggestive
of a police regulation. However, the purpose to preserve natural
beauty is more often a characteristic of zoning statutes. 7 Further-
more, the provisions of the statute are similar to other state statutes
which speak of "zone of regulation" and "nonconforming use" and
allow an amortization period for the termination of existing uses,
8
all of which are common to zoning statutes.
Whether the Ohio statute is treated as a police regulation or a
zoning statute, an analysis of the constitutionality of its prospective
application would not seem to differ materially since the purpose
and effect of the statute is the same however characterized.9 In
holding the statute a valid exercise of the police power, the court
was unwilling to upset the legislative determination that there is
some relation between the regulation of billboards and traffic
safety. Although the evidence was inconclusive,' 0 the court noted
that any distraction is at least of potential danger to a car traveling
at high speeds on an interstate highway. The "highway hypnosis"
theory that occasional momentary diversions such as reading a bill-
6. State ex rel. Spiros v. Payne, 131 Conn. 647, 41 A.2d 908 (1945). In a number
of cases, courts have considered regulations sufficiently similar to both zoning ordi-
nances and police statutes that when the enactment has been found invalid on one
basis, an attempt has been made to sustain it on the other. See, e.g., O'Connor v.
City of Moscow, 202 P.2d 401 (Idaho 1949); Town of Jaffrey v. Heffernan, 104 N.H.
249, 183 A.2d 246 (1962); Federal Advertising Corp. v. Recorder of Borough of Fair-
lawn, 8 N.J. Misc. 619, 151 At. 285 (1930).
7. Principal case at 436, 437, 200 N.E.2d at 336, 337.
8. See, e.g., Wxs. STAT. § 80.30 (1963). N.H. Rlv. STAT. ANN. § 249-A:1-12 (1964)
declares existing signs to be nonconforming uses and nuisances and requires their
removal within six months. In an advisory opinion the New Hampshire Supreme
Court seemed to recognize the "zoning" nature of its statute when it said that if
in a specific situation the statute forbids the maintenance of a sign which was not a
nuisance in fact, compensation would have to be paid for its removal. Opinion of
the Justices, 103 N.H. 268, 169 A.2d 762 (1961).
9. This is indicated by the court's citation of zoning cases while treating the statute
as a general police regulation. Principal case at 433, 200 N.E.2d at 334-35. See 29
FORDHAM L. Rxv. 749 (1961).
10. Even the "scientific" studies have produced contradictory results. The Driving
Research Laboratory of Iowa State College and the Michigan State Highway Dept.
found no significant correlation between billboards and traffic accidents, while the
Minnesota Highway Dept. did find a definite relationship. For a discussion of these
and other pertinent authorities, see Price, supra note 3, at 88.
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board advertisement are beneficial to the long distance traveler
was not considered significant." Because of the great weight given
to the presumption of constitutionality of a police regulation, the
safety factor was permitted to stand as "not clearly erroneous," thus
enabling the court to validate what concededly must be essentially
a regulation for aesthetic purposes. This is the technique used by
many courts that recognize the growing legal acceptance of aesthetic
considerations justifying police power supervision under an ex-
panded concept of the general welfare where there is additionally
some element of one of the more conventional bases of the police
power. 1 The technique is particularly appropriate in the regulation
of billboards where aesthetic considerations have long been signifi-
cant.13
Although the court had little difficulty upholding the statute
in its prospective application, the question of whether the statute
could validly be applied to require the abatement of certain exist-
ing billboards had not previously been decided.14 Had the statute
been treated as a zoning statute, it is questionable whether it would
have been sustained since retroactive application of zoning ordi-
nances has consistently been held invalid absent a showing of
nuisance, 15 and a mere legislative declaration of nuisance has been
held an insufficient showing by itself since it too easily may lead to
confiscation and destruction of property by legislative fiat.16 The bur-
11. But see Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 20 Ohio Op. 2d 51, 184 N.E.2d
552 (1962); United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 198 A.2d
447 (1964).
12. See, e.g., Murphy, Inc. v. Town of Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944);
New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941); Preferred Tires v. Hemp-
stead, 173 Misc. 1017, 19 N.Y.S.2d 374 (Sup. Ct. 1940). The greatest stimulus that
aesthetic considerations have received recently came from Mr. Justice Douglas' dictum
referring to the police power in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954): "The con-
cept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual
as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the
legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled."
13. Billboards were at first regulated on the basis of health, safety, and morals.
See, e.g., Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); St. Louis Gun-
ning Advertising Co. v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (1911). However, aesthetic
considerations were soon recognized. See, e.g., St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. St.
Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919). And in 1935 aesthetic considerations were heavily relied on
in General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193
N.E. 799 (1935). For detailed historical accounts, see generally Gilliam, The Case for
Billboard Control-Precedent and Prediction, 36 DiCrA 461 (1959); Comment, O'utdoor
Advertising-Aesthetics and the "Public Right," 33 TUL. L. R1v. 852 (1959).
14. Cf. Opinion of the Justices, 103 N.H. 268, 169 A.2d 762 (1961).
15. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 Pac. 14 (1930); Stoner
McCray Sys. v. City of Des Moines, 247 Iowa 1313, 78 N.W.2d 843 (1956); City of
Corpus Christi v. Allen, 152 Tex. 137, 254 S.W.2d 759 (1953); 1 Yoxi.tay, ZONING LAW
PaAarcnE § 150 (2d ed. 1953).
16. See Bane v. Township of Pontiac, 343 Mich. 481, 72 N.W.2d 134 (1955); Keenly
v. McCarty, 137 Misc. 524, 244 N.Y.S. 63 (1930). Although a valid police regulation
may reasonably declare certain things to be nuisances, mere legislative declaration
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den of proof, as regards the existence of a nuisance, seems to be placed
in each instance on the party attempting to show that the object in
question is a nuisance in fact.17 This is not an easy burden to shoul-
der, and there is no presumption of the validity of the classification of
a particular object as a nuisance to assist the state in sustaining its
statutory designation. In the past a public nuisance was generally
thought to be some noxious or harmful interference with the public
health, safety, or morals, or some substantial annoyance, inconven-
ience, or injury to the public.18 While these considerations remain
central, the expanding role of the states' police power has effected
an enlargement of the nuisance concept, as particularly evidenced
in the increasing acceptance of aesthetic considerations. 10 Since
aesthetic zoning has gained much of its recognition in cases involving
billboards, 20 it would seem that an expanded nuisance concept
might be used to require removal of nonconforming billboards.21
Even so, most courts recognize the harsh effects of a finding of
nuisance on existing property rights, and thus they continue to
require some substantial interference with another's rights before
does not make something a nuisance which is not one in fact. See, e.g., Lawton v.
Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894); Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497 (1870); Jones v.
City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 Pac. 14 (1930); Crawford v. City of Topeka, 51
Kan. 756, 33 Pac. 476 (1893); City of Houston v. Lurie, 148 Tex. 391, 113 S.W.2d
371 (1949).
17. See, e.g., Bane v. Township of Pontiac, 343 Mich. 481, 72 N.W.2d 134 (1955);
Keenly v. McCarty, 137 Misc. 524, 244 N.Y.S. 63 (Sup. Ct. 1930). Cf. Adams v. Kala-
mazoo Ice & Fuel Co., 245 Mich. 261, 222 N.W. 86 (1928).
18. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 316, 295 Pac. 14, 20 (1930); Common-
wealth v. South Covington & C. St. Ry., 181 Ky. 459, 463, 205 S.W. 581, 583 (1918);
JOYCE, NUISANCES § 5 (1906).
19. See, e.g., Martin v. Williams, 141 W. Va. 595, 93 S.E.2d 835 (1956); Oscar P.
Gustafson Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 231 Minn. 271, 42 N.W.2d 809 (1950); Common-
wealth v. Trimmer, 53 Dauph. Co. 91, 34 Munic. L.R. 36 (Pa. 1942); Parkersburg
Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 118 W. Va. 608, 191 S.E. 368 (1937); People v.
Sterling, 128 Misc. 650, 220 N.Y.S. 315 (Sup. Ct. 1927); Churchill v. Rafferty, 32 Phil.
580 (1915), appeal dismissed, 248 U.S. 591 (1918). See generally Noel, Retroactive Zoning
and Nuisances, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1941); Noel, Unaesthetic Sights as Nuisances,
25 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1939); Rodda, The Accomplishment of Aesthetic Purposes Under
the Police Power, 27 So. CAL. L. REV. 149 (1954); Comment, 33 TUL. L. REv. 852 (1959).
20. It has been suggested that while aesthetics has received greater direct approval
in billboard cases involving specific billboard legislation, "actual accomplishment of
aesthetic purposes seems to be much greater and of much broader scope in the
comprehensive zoning field." Rodda, supra note 19, at 177-78.
21. Indeed, the court in the classic case of General Outdoor Advertising Co. v.
Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935), thought that offensive
sights could be deemed nuisances. While the decision did not technically abate exist-
ing billboards as nuisances since the signs involved had been erected after the statute
had been passed and pursuant to permits which had since expired, it has been noted
that the enforcement of the statute resulted in the removal of an estimated ninety-six
per cent of all billboards in the state, including one erected near the Boston Common
at a cost of $35,000 and maintained at an expense of $1,000 per month. Rhyne &
Rhyne, Municipal Regulation of Signs, Billboards, Marquees, Canopies, Awnings and
Street Clocks, in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MUNICIPAL LAW OFFICERS, REPORT No. 137,
at 10-11 (1952).
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deeming an existing use a nuisance.22 It is doubtful, therefore,
whether the billboards in the principal case could be proved to be
nuisances in fact.
23
However, the court treated the statute as a general police regula-
tion. Under this characterization the court did not need to find the
billboards to be nuisances; rather, it was sufficient to find simply
a reasonable relation between the removal of these billboards and
the promotion of the public safety and general welfare in order to
terminate the existing use.24 Once such a reasonable relationship
was found to exist, the billboard owner then had the heavy burden
of proof of demonstrating, against a presumption of the constitu-
tionality of the statute, that the private interest outweighed the
public interest. The court stressed that the billboards in question
were located near an expressway interchange and took judicial
notice of the difficulty in negotiating an unfamiliar interchange.
Therefore, it was thought that the "distraction, annoyance, incon-
venience and even danger" that could be caused by these billboards
was at least as great as by billboards on the open highway.235 Conse-
quently, the court found a reasonable relationship between the
removal of billboards and the state police power. The court then
noted that the billboard owner had made no showing that its bill-
boards could not be used in some other location where they would
be lawful or that any loss would be incurred in removing or relo-
cating the billboards.2 Therefore, even under a balancing test the
billboard owner had offered no reason sufficient to prevent the
abatement of its billboards.
Since the protection of private property from arbitrary legisla-
tive interference seems to be sufficient reason to deny a presumption
of constitutionality to a legislative declaration of nuisance in a
zoning statute, it is difficult to justify allowing such a presumption
where the legislature has attempted to effect the same result through
a simple prohibition of an existing use by a police regulation. This
is particularly anomalous in the principal case where the billboard
statute has many of the attributes of a zoning statute.27 Private
22. See, e.g., City of Passaic v. H. B. Reed & Co., 70 N.J. Super. 542, 176 A.2d 27
(1961); Central Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of Evendale, 54 Ohio Op. 354, 124
N.E.2d 189 (1954); cf. Incorporated Village of Brockline v. Paulgene Realty Corp.,
24 Misc. 2d 790, 200 N.Y.S.2d 126 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Hartung v. County of Milwaukee,
2 Wis. 2d 269, 86 N.V.2d 475 (1957).
23. Indeed, the trial court specifically found that these billboards were not nui-
sances. Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 20 Ohio Op. 2d 51, 184 N.E.2d 552 (1962).
24. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Reinman v. City of Little
Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
25. Principal case at 440, 200 N.E.2d at 339.
26. Ibid.
27. See notes 6-8 supra and accompanying text. In Des Jardin v. Town of Green-
field, 262 Wis. 43, 53 N.W.2d 784 (1952), an ordinance requiring all occupied house
trailers to be kept in licensed camp grounds was considered sufficiently similar to a
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property rights would seem to warrant greater protection than that
accorded in the principal case where the court permitted the destruc-
tion of a property interest by its allocation of the burden of proof.
zoning ordinance to require application of zoning rules and allowance for a non-
conforming use.
